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MORAL ISSUES AND THE
VIRTUOUS JUDGE:
REFLECTIONS ON THE
NOMINATION AND
CONFIRMATION OF
SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES
ROBERT J. ARAUJO, S.J.*
"Love Virtue, you who are judges on earth ....
INTRODUCTION
I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I
do step down, the confirmation process for my successor well may fo-
cus on the issue [of abortion] before us today. That, I regret, may be
exactly where the choice between the two worlds [i.e., between the
right to have an abortion and the state's regulation of abortion] will be
made.
2
The nature of any society therefore is not to be deciphered from its
laws alone, but from those understood as an index of its conflicts.
3
* The author is an Associate Professor of Law at Gonzaga University School of Law. He
has been a lecturer in law at Boston College Law School and an Adjunct Professor of Law at
Georgetown University. He received his A.B. and J.D. degrees from Georgetown Univer-
sity, his LL.M. and J.S.D. degrees from Columbia University, and his B.C.L. from Oxford
University. The author obtained his M.Div. and S.T.L. degrees from the Weston School of
Theology.
I Wisdom 1:1 (Jerusalem Bible).
2 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2854-55 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
3 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MoRAL THEORY 254 (2d ed. 1984).
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While each of these quotations originates from a different source,
both are united in their dealing with law, the societies governed by such
laws, and the people involved with the creation and interpretation of
these laws. Particularly, both statements establish the foundation for
the issues of this Article: Who are our judges? What is their role? Is it
their role to resolve conflict in our society? When we address these ques-
tions, we often face an implicit issue: What are the criteria for selecting
judicial candidates?
In the United States, the officials responsible for selecting judges-
chief executives, legislatures, and the electorate-are often guided by a
variety of factors, many of which have political overtones. However,
while the last two decades of judicial selection at the national level have
primarily focused on political considerations, questions raising moral
considerations have surfaced more and more. For example, during the
late 1960s and early 1970s, moral issues concerning questionable finan-
cial dealings, memberships in discriminatory clubs and organizations,
and conflicts of interest were instrumental in the critique and defeat of
the nominations of Justice Abe Fortas for Chief Justice,4 and federal
Judges Clement Haynsworth5 and Harrold Carswell6 for Associate Jus-
tices of the United States Supreme Court.
Beginning with the nomination to the Supreme Court of Judge San-
dra Day O'Connor, a good deal of the moral focus has shifted to issues
such as privacy and autonomy, abortion rights, and discrimination
against certain classes of persons.7 Indeed, perhaps the major issue sur-
rounding recent Supreme Court nominations concerns the right to pri-
vacy which emerged from the 1973 abortion decision of Roe v. Wade.'
Justice Blackmun's statement which begins this Article forecasts that
4 See Linda Greenhouse, Ex-Justice Abe Fortas Dies at 71: Shaped Historic Rulings on
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1982, at AI; see also, Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process
And The Public: To Know Or Not To Know, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1213, 1216 (1988).
5 See Alfonso Narvaez, Clement Haynsworth Dies At 77: Lost Struggle For High Court
Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1989, at D21; see also Mitchell McConnell, Haynsworth and
Carswell: A New Senate Standard of Excellence, 59 Ky. L.J. 7, 7 (1970). Senator McCon-
nell, then a staff member to Senator Cook, offered thoughts and suggestions about "a mean-
ingful standard by which the Senate might judge future Supreme Court nominees." Id.
6 See Bruce Lambert, G. Harrold Carswell Is Dead At 72: Was RejectedFor Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1992, at 11; see generally JOHN FRANK, CLEMENT HAYNSWORTH, THE
SENATE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1991); Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, on Nomination Of George Harrold Carswell, Of Florida, To Be Associ-
ate Justice Of The Supreme Court Of The United States, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [herein-
after Carswell Hearings].
7 Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on the Nomina-
tion Of Judge Sandra Day O'Connor, to be an Associate Justice Of The Supreme Court Of
The United States, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 60-63, 75-79, 98, 119-21, 126-27, 148-51, 160, 162-
63, 171-72 (1981) [hereinafter cited as O'Connor Hearings].
8 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the divisive abortion issue could well affect the selection, nomination,
and confirmation of federal judicial candidates in the future. Accord-
ingly, interest groups can be expected to lobby the President and the
Senate, pressuring those screening potential judicial nominees to ascer-
tain the sympathies and attitudes of candidates toward specific issues
such as abortion, affirmative action, and criminal-versus-victim's rights.
With the election of Bill Clinton as President and the vacancy of over one
hundred federal judgeships which President Clinton will be asked to fill,9
issues are raised regarding the criteria for evaluating and selecting judi-
cial candidates and the role politics and morality will play in the process.
The primary focus of this Article is to suggest additional judicial se-
lection criteria for identifying those judges who will competently address
difficult moral issues. It is submitted that it is both proper and neces-
sary to examine a judicial candidate's qualities to determine whether he
or she will become a virtuous judge. Part I of this Article formulates the
issue of the selection of judicial candidates by briefly identifying the gen-
eral criteria which have been traditionally used.- In addition, Part I
notes that, since 1981, one Senator has continuously employed virtue-
like criteria that both complement and transcend traditional criteria.
Part II identifies these "transcendent" qualities and demonstrates how
they raise the criteria of virtues that relate to the execution of judicial
functions. This section will also explain the virtues and their prospective
roles in the exercise of judicial functions. In addition, Part II briefly ex-
amines the history of the virtuous person in public life. Part III
refocuses this examination by analyzing the forces which have affected
the nominations for vacancies on the United States Supreme Court since
the beginning of the Reagan Administration. This Article focuses on
Supreme Court nominations because they have produced the more fully
documented cases of how judicial candidates have been evaluated. In
particular, a review of the confirmation process surrounding Judge Rob-
ert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court will illustrate that the con-
firmation process has not always dealt with criteria that transcend polit-
ical considerations.
Finally, Part IV elaborates on how the virtues of justice, prudence,
courage, and wisdom can provide judges with the tools they need to bet-
ter evaluate and decide the difficult cases which flood the federal courts
today. This analysis focuses on the case of Grove City College v. Bell1°
which involved the application of Title IX of the 1972 Education Amend-
ments to institutions of higher education that receive federal funds.
9 See Neil A. Lewis, Conservatives Set for Fight on Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1992, at B16.
10 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
35 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE: CRITERIA FOR JUDICIAL SELECTION
Observers of the process of selecting federal judges have assumed
correctly that Presidents often select judicial candidates based on polit-
ical considerations, as well as general ideological compatibility with their
own views.11 The reality that judicial selection is simultaneously a polit-
ical and ideological process can be viewed in the fact that both the execu-
tive and legislative branches exercise authority in filling vacancies.
Although the power to nominate is vested with the President, the Sen-
ate's power to confirm the candidate after giving its advice and consent
counterbalances the presidential authority.
12
A. Historical Approach
Although some nominations, notably the 1987 candidacy of Judge
Bork, have been distinguished by strong disagreement which surfaced
between the President and the Senate, most nominees have been given
senatorial consent without much, if any, debate. In fact, it was not until
the nomination of Harlan Fiske Stone in 1925 that the Senate first called
a Supreme Court nominee before the Judiciary Committee to answer
specific questions.' 3 Moreover, only with the 1955 nomination of John
Marshall Harlan did the Senate begin to require that a nominee appear
before the Judiciary Committee to discuss his views on substantive legal
issues.14 Initially, these brief hearings served as a reminder to the exec-
utive branch that the Senate has a constitutional role to execute in the
appointment of federal judges.
B. Approach Taken During the Late 1960s and 1970s
By 1968, however, a change emerged in which the Senate pursued a
more vigorous role in the confirmation process of Thurgood Marshall as
11 Henry Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law Or Politics?, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1202,
1203-04 (1988).
12 U.S. CONST., art II, § 2. See generally David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate,
the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L. J. 1491 (1992) (encouraging
Democratic Senate to forego posture of deference in face of so many conservative nomina-
tions). The authors argue that this deference "creates serious risks from the standpoint of
checks and balances" and urge that the Senate "insist on its constitutional prerogatives."
Id. at 1520; see also Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme
Court Nominees, 79 YALE L. J. 657, 657 (1971) (proposing it is duty of Senator to vote
against nominee whose views are bad for country); Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Advice and
Consent: The Role of the United States Senate in the Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 200 (1987).
13 William G. Ross, The Questioning Of Supreme Court Nominees At Senate Confirmation
Hearings: Proposals For Accommodating The Needs Of The Senate And Ameliorating The
Fears Of The Nominees, 62 TUL. L. REV. 109, 116-17 (1987).
14 Id. at 119.
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an Associate Justice and Associate Justice Abe Fortas as Chief Justice of
the United States. 15 In the case of Abe Fortas' nomination, some sena-
tors resisted the typically automatic approval of elevating an Associate
Justice to the position of Chief Justice without vigorously exercising
their constitutional power. During Justice Fortas' hearing, questions
surfaced about his receipt of a $20,000 grant from a family foundation,
one of whose members had been indicted for stock manipulation.'
6
While President Nixon's subsequent nomination of Justice Warren
Burger for Chief Justice was not considered controversial and, thus,
moved quickly through the confirmation process, his nominations of
Clement Haynsworth and Harrold Carswell stumbled on major ethical
considerations involving the stock ownership of Judge Haynsworth 17
and the racial attitudes of Judge Carswell. i" After the latter two nomi-
nations failed, President Nixon nominated Harry Blackmun, a distin-
guished but little-known Circuit Court Judge, to occupy the seat that
neither Judges Haynsworth nor Carswell could fill. In 1971, President
Nixon nominated Lewis Powell, a distinguished practitioner and former
president of the American Bar Association, to fill another vacancy. Both
Blackmun's and Powell's nominations were subdued events that gave lit-
tle opportunity for substantive senatorial debate.
The confirmation process surrounding President Ford's noncontro-
versial nomination of Judge John Paul Stevens also moved through the
Senate with little difficulty; however, post-Watergate concerns led the
Senate to spend considerable time questioning Judge Stevens about is-
sues such as discrimination, capital punishment, wiretapping, amend-
ments to the United States Constitution, and criminal procedure.1
9
C.. Approach Taken During the 1980s
The presidency of Jimmy Carter passed without any opportunity to
nominate and confirm a Supreme Court Justice. However, the resigna-
tion of Justice Potter Stewart in 1981 provided President Reagan with
an opportunity to nominate a new member of the Supreme Court. It was
during this historic nomination process of the first woman Justice, Judge
Sandra Day O'Connor, that the Senate began to identify and regularly
articulate a variety of criteria for the selection of judicial candidates for
the Supreme Court. During Judge O'Connor's nomination hearings,
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee offered opening statements
for the first time and listed their own criteria for confirmation. In the
15 See id. at 120.
16 See Greenhouse, supra note 4, at Al.
17 See Narvaez, supra note 5, at D21.
18 See Lambert, supra note 6, at 11.
19 Ross, supra note 13, at 121.
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past, the committee chair simply called the nomination hearings to or-
der, and the nominee's home state Congressional delegation and the At-
torney General introduced the nominee.2 °
1. Traditional Considerations Concerning a Nominee's Qualifications
Typically, senatorial considerations concerning the qualifications of
nominees to the Supreme Court involved three principal areas: first, the
personal attributes of intellectual capacity, competence, and tempera-
ment;2 1 second, the candidate's moral and ethical stature; and third, the
nominee's adherence to upholding the laws and Constitution of the
United States and honoring judicial precedent.2 2 These three major ar-
eas have been utilized in the subsequent nominations of Justice William
Rehnquist for Chief Justice, and Judges Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter for
Associate Justices. However, major emphasis was also building on the
question of the right to privacy, especially in the realm of abortion.2 3
While these criteria played a role in the nomination of Judge Robert
Bork to Associate Justice, questions about constitutional ideology and
whether Judge Bork was a part of mainstream jurisprudence became
both relevant and critical to the senatorial debate during his unsuccess-
ful bid to join the Court.2 4
20 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, Unites States Senate, on Nom-
ination of Harry A. Blackmun, Of Minnesota, To Be Associate Justice Of The Supreme
Court Of The United States, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1970) [hereinafter Blackmun Hear-
ings]. But see, O'Connor Hearings, supra note 7, at 1-31.
21 See, e.g., O'Connor Hearings, supra note 7, at 3 (Senator Biden on intellectual capacity,
temperament, competence, moral character, freedom from conflicts of interest, ability to
uphold the laws of the U.S.); id. at 14 (Senator Leahy on fairness); id. at 23 (Senator
Grassley on compassion). These attributes can be termed the nominee's "judicial manner."
22 Id. at 3.
23 Ross, supra note 13, at 135. See, e.g., O'Connor Hearings, supra note 7, at 28 (Senator
Denton drawing attention to divisiveness and significance of abortion issue); Hearings
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on the Nomination Of Justice
William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of The United States, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
573-604, 787-816, 914-15, 949-50 (1986) [hereinafter Rehnquist Hearings]; Hearing Before
the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on the Nomination Of Anthony M.
Kennedy to be Associate Justice of The Supreme Court Of The United States, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 432-55, 1084-97 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy Hearings]; Hearing Before the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on the Nomination Of David H. Souter to be
Associate Justice of The Supreme Court Of The United States, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 362-
414, 565-607, 666-713 (1990) [hereinafter Souter Hearings].
24 S. Exac. REP. No. 7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-21 (1987) ("Judge Bork's view of the Consti-
tution disregards this country's tradition of human dignity, liberty and unenumerated
rights"); id. at 30-96.
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2. Senator Thurmond's Considerations Concerning a Nominee's
Qualifications
Since 1981, Senator Strom Thurmond has consistently offered a
somewhat different set of criteria for nominees to the nation's highest
court. At the nomination hearings of Judge Sandra Day O'Connor, Sena-
tor Thurmond introduced the theme of the virtues-or lack thereof-of
candidates. While his views about general qualifications overlap with
other senators,2" he has also demonstrated concern about a nominee's
virtues.2 6
When members of the Judiciary Committee first offered criteria re-
lating to a Supreme Court nominee's qualifications in 1981, Senator
Thurmond suggested a number of such criteria for the selection of "an
outstanding jurist."2 7 Some of the concepts he relied upon have long
been associated with human virtues. Senator Thurmond argued that a
judge, and therefore a judicial candidate, must possess the courage and
fortitude needed to "stand firm and render decisions based not on per-
sonal beliefs but, instead, in accordance with the Constitution and the
will of the people as expressed in the laws of Congress."2" Moreover, he
has suggested that judicial candidates should possess the requisite qual-
ity of "compassion which tempers with mercy the judgment of the crimi-
nal, yet recognizes the sorrow and suffering of the victim; compassion for
the individual but also compassion for society in its quest for the overrid-
ing goal of equal justice under law."29
The Senator's list is not a complete discourse on virtuous criteria.
Nevertheless, his language is neither alien nor unrelated to the other
virtuous qualities which will be evaluated in the context of criteria for
judicial selection. The virtue criteria used to evaluate a judicial candi-
date are, when taken as a coherent package, vital to the consideration of
judicial qualifications.
25 See O'Connor Hearings, supra note 7, at 2, where Senator Thurmond's list of qualifica-
tions overlap with other senators on selection criteria: a person of integrity (one who is
fair, honest, and incorruptible); a person learned in the law; a person who possesses the
necessary temperament and demeanor; and a person respectful of American legal and
political institutions and the Constitution.
26 See O'Connor Hearings, supra note 7, at 2; Rehnquist Hearings, supra note 23, at 1;
Hearings Before the Committee On The Judiciary, United States Senate, on the Nomination
Of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice Of The Supreme Court of The United States, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1987) [hereinafter Bork Hearings]; Kennedy Hearings, supra note 23, at
30, 35; Souter Hearings, supra note 23, at 13 (Senator Thurmond's addresses on virtue
criteria).
27 See O'Connor Hearings, supra note 7, at 1.
28 Id. at 2.
29 Id.
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II. THE CRITERIA OF VIRTUES
A. The Nature of Virtues
Alasdair MacIntyre defined virtue as "an acquired human quality
the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those
goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively
prevents us from achieving such goods."30 MacIntyre's predecessor,
Thomas Aquinas, saw virtue as "a good quality of the mind" by which
people live righteously.3 In the context of the ethical system which is
generated by human virtues, MacIntyre's definition of virtue raises three
principal questions about human beings and human nature: Who are
we? Is there some future goal regarding "good" toward which we strive
or ought to strive? If so, what is the method or practice by which we get
there? If the function of ethics is to guide us-including judges-toward
right action,32 an ethics based on virtue engages us as moral agents who
are seeking to make ourselves better moral agents in the future.33 At the
heart of the future of the moral agent is a goal, a telos.34 Because indi-
vidual humans are also social beings whose existence is grounded in re-
lationships with others, the concept of the telos helps the judicial candi-
date better understand the second question advanced by MacIntyre by
placing it into a communal setting where judges must deliberate upon a
case and reach a decision that will reconcile conflicts between two or
more members of the community.35
Joseph Kotva points out that, for some individuals, the kind of per-
son each of us is molds the kind of moral questions we face.36 His obser-
30 MACINTYRE, supra note 3, at 191. By a "practice," MacIntyre means "any coherent and
complex form of socially established cooperative human activity... which are appropriate
to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systemati-
cally extended." Id. at 187.
31 THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II, vol. 7, at 68 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., 2d ed. 1927).
32 James Keenan, S.J., Virtue Ethics: Making A Case As It Comes Of Age, 67 THOUGHT 115
(1992).
33 Id. at 116.
34 See MAcINTYRE, supra note 3, at 203. MacIntyre explains that "there is a telos which
transcends the limited goods of practices by constituting the good of a whole human life,
the good of a human life conceived as a unity." Id.; see also Keenan, Virtue Ethics, supra
note 32, at 120, 123; Joseph Kotva, An Appeal For A Christian Virtue Ethic, 67 THOUGHT
158, 159 (1992). As James Keenan stresses, "[o]nly in virtue ethics is a telos constitutive of
method; no other ethical system can make that claim." Keenan, supra note 32, at 123.
35 See Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Teleology of the Law: Responsible Citizenship as Disciple-
ship, 35 CATH. LAw. 57, 57 (1992) (suggesting a connection between law as a social institu-
tion and community goals).
36 Kotva, supra note 34, at 159. As this author further suggests, "the means cannot be
separated from the end because the means are central to the end. A telos which embodies
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vation and conclusion suggests that the practice of virtue ethics acknowl-
edges the sense of "otherness;" that is, in making moral decisions about
who we are, what our goal is, and what means we use to get there, we
necessarily think of other individuals as we work toward the goal. The
practice of virtue ethics, in short, is based on a sense of community and
on an awareness of a relationship with others.
Mary Ann Glendon recognized and addressed this awareness in the
context of the abortion rights argument which emerged from Roe v. Wade
and which has been advanced by Justice Blackmun's statement cited at
the beginning of this Article. 37 While the rhetoric of the majority opinion
in Roe focused on the individual, that is, the attending physician or the
pregnant woman, and the individual's right to privacy, 38 Glendon ex-
presses her concern that the interests of the other-that the concerns of
the community most involved with pregnancy and the legality and mo-
rality of abortion-are ignored. She addresses this concern by stating
that "[t]he voice we hear in the Supreme Court's abortion narrative-
presenting us with the image of the pregnant woman as distinct from the
father of the unborn child... and insulated from society... is ... dis-
tinctively American ... in its lonely individualism and libertarianism."3 9
Since much of the discussion in American jurisprudence focuses on
the individual and his or her rights and liberties, especially the right to
privacy, it is suggested that reliance on virtues and virtue ethics may
help us understand that the individual is not an autonomous being, but a
member of a community. Furthermore, acknowledgment of this fact is
important in the exercise of judicial duties. After all, judges are often
asked to resolve conflict between people when they are called upon by
litigants to render justice by adjudicating the disagreement. Conse-
quently, judges are concerned about individuals who live in a commu-
nity, not individuals who live in isolation from one another. Yes, indi-
viduals have rights, including rights regarding privacy. But this is not
the only right with which judges are or can be concerned.
The tension that can emerge between individuals or between an in-
dividual and the rest of his or her community has been considered in the
historical study of virtues and the virtuous person. Plato was an early
commentator who raised the issue of virtue and its relationship to jus-
tice. For Plato, justice was the fundamental component of society, the
the virtues of justice, courage, and fidelity cannot be severed from acts and social arrange-
ments that are just, courageous, and faithful." Id. at 160.
37 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
38 See 410 U.S. at 152-56.
39 MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES,
EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 52 (1987) [hereinafter ABORTION].
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"necessary conduct in everything from beginning to end."40 Above all
else, justice, as a virtue, was the guarantor of other virtues like temper-
ance, courage, and wisdom.
4 1
Aristotle saw justice as the "complete virtue" in the context of a per-
son being in right relation with his or her neighbor.4 2 In refining his
thought about justice as the greatest of virtues, Aristotle concluded that
people who are true friends 43 have no need for justice because their
friendship is the truest form of justice.4 4
In a contemporary fashion, Mary Ann Glendon has reaffirmed Aris-
totle's position. She points out that the tendency to make rights and pri-
vacy absolute in the American culture have minimized the significance of
fraternity.45 Glendon argues that,
in its relentless individualism, [American rights talk] fosters a climate
that is inhospitable to society's losers, and that systematically disad-
vantages caretakers and dependents, young and old. In its neglect of
civil society, it undermines the principal seedbeds of civic and personal
virtue. In its insularity, it shuts out potentially important aids to the
process of self-correcting learning. All of these traits promote mere
assertion over reason-giving.
46
As previously mentioned, Aquinas saw virtue as the good quality of
the mind which facilitates people living righteously. He also acknowl-
edged that the virtue of justice is a good habit in which each person per-
petually renders to the other person that which is due.4 7 In short, from
Plato to Aquinas, the virtue of justice is practiced by human beings in a
community setting. It is not understood as something which is good or
proper for the individual alone; rather, it manifests itself in a good rela-
tionship or true friendship. Justice as a virtue manifests itself in the
midst of people who are in relationships with one another; it does not
exist in the vacuum of persons who are isolated from one another. Es-
sentially, the virtue of justice depends on community; its prerequisite is
40 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, bk. IV, at 432D (Richard W. Sterling & William C. Scoh trans.,
1st ed. 1985).
41 Id at 433C.
42 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. E, ch. 3, 80, ch. 3, 1129, b27 (N. Kretzmann
et al. eds.).
43 Id. at bk. VIII, 143, ch. 3, 1156".
44 Id. at bk. VIII, 140, ch. 1, 1155'.
45 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 47-48
(1991) [hereinafter RIGHTS TALK]. Christopher Mooney has similarly commented on this
theme in the context of the law and legal profession. He argues that the law's "privatizing
impulse has tended to become dominant and it no longer conceives its primary mission to
be the responsible exercise of public virtue." CHRISTOPHER MOONEY, S.J., PUBLIC VIRTUE:
LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION at xi (1986).
46 MOONEY, supra note 45, at 14.
47 AQUINAS, supra note 31, at pt. II, vol. 7, 100-0211-Il, question 58, art. 1.
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two or more people who acknowledge one another's existence where each
honors the other person's right to co-exist, and where each expects his or
her own right to exist to be honored by the other.
The goal, then, of the virtue of justice is to achieve multiple levels of
reciprocity throughout society in which people render to one another
those concerns which they have for themselves. The virtuous person,
who becomes the virtuous judge and who will have the duty to render
justice, can see this readily.
Within the privacy rights rhetoric of Roe, the kind of justice which
emerges has lost a good deal of its community-oriented goal. The result-
ing language about "justice" is narrowly focused on addressing exclu-
sively individual, not community, concerns. Mary Ann Glendon points
out that the social, communal, and teleological components of duties that
are the correlatives of rights are not discussed in this environment. 48
She correctly argues that these components are essential to dealing
justly with the urgent matter of abortion which has, in the American
context, been cloaked with the absolute rights of privacy, individual au-
tonomy, and isolation. 4 9 To balance the excessive and narrow focus on
the rights which emerge from the principle of autonomy, Glendon draws
attention to the importance of understanding the needs of all the parties
involved (the pregnant woman, the fetus, and the community) in order to
reach the just end concerning the rights and responsibilities associated
with human reproduction.
If we try to ascertain the just goal of society and its members, a vir-
tuous solution to interpersonal conflict begins to emerge. In response to
legal controversies that work their way into courts, justice-as-virtue
avoids the problem of "winner-take-all" that characterizes much of the
process of litigation over which judges preside. But, as a practical mat-
ter, how do we move toward the goal of justice as virtuous people? This
is where the virtue of prudence becomes relevant.
If the virtue of justice prescribes the just goal or end, then prudence
is the means to that end.5 0 A fundamental approach to obtain such
means was suggested by Senator Thurmond when he raised the topic of
compassion. Senator Thurmond recommended improvements in social
structures that will display greater charity toward both individuals and
society at large.5 2 Senator Thurmond may have unknowingly taken his
cue from Aquinas who acknowledged the virtue of prudence which di-
48 See RIGHTS TALK, supra note 45, at 14, 45, 47, 171-72.
49 ABORTION, supra note 39, at 38.
50 Kotva, supra note 34, at 166.
51 See, e.g., O'Connor Hearings, supra note 7, at 2 (Senator Thurmond discussing the vir-
tue of compassion); see Benjamin Zipursky, DeShaney And The Jurisprudence Of Compas-
sion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1134-37 (1990).
52 O'Connor Hearings, supra note 7, at 2.
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rects people so that they relate their own good to the good of others-the
common good.5 3 Plato's discussion of the virtue of temperance parallels
Aquinas' prudence: it is the virtue which brings harmony into society by
promoting "concord" among all the elements of the community so that
they coexist harmoniously.
5 4
For Aristotle, the understanding of human virtue concentrated on a
state of character, concerned with choice, lying in a mean-the mean
relative to us, determined by a rational principle, and by that principle
as determined by a man of practical wisdom. Now, it is a mean between
two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on de-
fect; and, again, it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or
exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds
and chooses that which is intermediate.
55
The concern about virtue raises considerations which every member
of the political society can reflect upon and adopt regardless of personal
beliefs surrounding the judicial nomination. Even the most politically
motivated person could likely take comfort knowing that a judge prac-
tices the virtue of compassion or temperance. Compassion and temper-
ance provide an atmosphere which helps reassure that each litigant's
concerns will be carefully evaluated. The virtue of compassion sets the
stage for another virtue raised by Senator Thurmond-courage.
Courage is the virtue that enables us to meet the challenge of harm
or danger when we attempt to take action based on the care and concern
we have for individuals and communities.5 6 The exercise of this virtue
takes place when judges, in controversial cases, face risks and threats.5"
Underlying the virtues of justice, prudence, and courage, is the vir-
tue of wisdom. Wisdom provides the insight, the sagacity by which we
come to understand who we are and where we ought to be. In the realm
of judges and justices whose duty it is to reconcile differences by often
making difficult decisions in the process, wisdom enlightens the jurist to
the variety and subtlety of issues and facts in each case. Cultivation of
this virtue can open the mind as well as the heart to matters which the
person not relying on the virtue of wisdom may miss. It parallels pru-
dence, and works in tandem with it. In a virtue-ethics approach to many
of today's difficult legal issues, wisdom guides us in our quest for under-
standing who we are as individuals and as members of society, and what
we want to become. In an American culture that is strongly character-
53 AQUINAS, supra note 31, at 100-02, question 50, art. 2.
54 PLATO, supra note 40, at bk. IV, 432.
55 ARISTOTLE, supra note 42, at bk. II, ch. 6, 1107'.
56 MACINTYRE, supra note 3, at 192.
57 Id. at 123. Maclntyre equates courageousness with reliability. Id.
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ized by "individual autonomy and isolation,""s the focus of our individual
and community attention on who we are can be blurred. Wisdom helps
remove the blur that otherwise inhibits the ability to identify not only
who we are now but also what we want to be in the future. When wis-
dom infects our consciousness, our knowledge of ourselves becomes more
secure and more certain. When our self-knowledge grows, the vision of
who we want to become both as individuals and as communities will be-
come all the more clear. When our knowledge of who we want to become
is better defined, our "moral idealism [can] be found and maintained."5 9
B. Why Virtue?
The virtuous judge is concerned about acting ethically and morally
in his or her attempt to bring peaceful resolution of disputes among citi-
zens. The judge can also profit from the experience other professions
have had in situating virtue within their professions. Members of the
medical profession have addressed how virtues and virtue-based ethics
can contribute to the betterment of health providers, patients, and soci-
ety. The words of Edmund Pellegrino, M.D., offer insight which can pro-
vide lawyers, some of whom will be future judges, and some of whom will
participate in the selection of judges, with wise counsel worth taking to
heart:
[V]irtue-based ethic is inherently elitist, in the best sense, because its
adherents demand more of themselves than the prevailing morality.
It calls forth that extra measure of dedication that has made the best
physicians in every era exemplars of what the human spirit can
achieve. No matter to what depths a society may fall, virtuous per-
sons will always be the beacons that light the way back to moral sensi-
tivity; virtuous physicians [and judges] are the beacons that show the
way back to moral credibility for the whole profession. 60
Pellegrino points to the dedication that makes a person the best in
his or her profession not only on a technical level for a specific patient,
but also on the level of doing better for the entire community which the
professional serves. This extra measure of dedication might conse-
quently help the legal professional intensify the effort to achieve the goal
of giving justice through the reconciliation of conflict and the promotion
of "concord" or harmony.
Pellegrino's concept of the virtuous physician may have already af-
fected those concerned about the virtuous judge or the virtuous judicial
58 ABORTION, supra note 39, at 38. See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion:
Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1011, 1066 (1989).
59 Keenan, supra note 32, at 123.
60 Edmund Pellegrino, M.D., The Virtuous Physician, and The Ethics of Medicine, in VIR-
TUE AND MEDICINE 252 (Earl Shep ed., 1985).
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candidate. For example, Senator Thurmond has been consistent with his
virtue-like qualifications since 1981.61 Moreover, several of his col-
leagues have used virtue language in describing the qualifications for
judicial nominees. With regard to justice, at the O'Connor nomination
hearings in 1981, Senator Howell Heflin argued that a judge must pos-
sess "an abiding love of justice" because jurists are "custodians of jus-
tice."6 2 Heflin, himself a former state supreme court judge, viewed jus-
tice as "the great cement of a civilized society" in which, rather than
being pitted against one another, people are brought "together as a peo-
ple, and as a Nation."6 3 As he concluded his opening remarks at the
O'Connor confirmation hearing, Heflin reminded those present about the
advice of Judge Learned Hand which may constitute one of the great
commandments of civil law: "Thou shalt not ration justice."64
In his opening remarks at the hearing for Judge Robert Bork's nomi-
nation to the Supreme Court, Senator Edward Kennedy suggested that
the special quality that empowers a judge to "render justice" is a synthe-
sis of fairness, impartiality, open-mindedness, and a temperament that
no bias or prejudice can call home.65 Senator Dennis DeConcini pointed
out that a judge who is called upon to issue justice must do so in order
that not only the "haves," but the "have nots" are afforded the protection
of the law and the opportunity for their interests to be heard and judged
upon fairly.
66
But to do justice, to render good decisions, to be, as Pellegrino sug-
gests, an "exemplar of what the human spirit can achieve," a judge must
cultivate the virtue of wisdom. Wisdom enables the judge to discern
what is at stake, to understand more clearly the concerns of those for
whom a case means so much. At the nomination of Associate Justice
Rehnquist to become Chief Justice, Senator Heflin touched upon the vir-
tue of wisdom by quoting Cicero: "He saw life clearly and he saw it
whole."6 7 In the realm of the judicial selection process in late twentieth
century America, the counsel of Cicero could well mean that a virtuous
judge cannot be satisfied with having some command of the case and the
parties whose vital interests are involved. Not only must the wise judge
have the capacity and the will to see the case, the law, and the parties
clearly and with an open mind, he must also view these concepts as they
apply to the history of the law, the building of judicial precedent, and the
61 See O'Conner Hearings, supra note 7, at 2.
62 Id. at 26.
63 Id. at 27.
64 Id.
65 Bork Hearings, supra note 26, at 33.
66 Souter Hearings, supra note 23, at 30.
67 Rehnquist Hearings, supra note 23, at 34.
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evolution of the law as a coherent means of reconciling conflict for both
today and the future.
Attributes often cited as those needed by good judges to reconcile
differences and to resolve conflict are patience, intelligence, integrity,
fairness, and open-mindedness. These attributes relate to the virtues
that facilitate attaining the just goal.6" Through personal patience, at-
tentiveness, open-mindedness, self-restraint, seeking the truth, and in-
tegrity that avoids even the slightest suspicion of prejudice for or against
any specific party, a judge is apt to see not only a way, but a better way
to resolve a case, reconcile conflict, and seek the just end.
In some cases, pressure from the media, lawyers, and even judicial
colleagues, may restrain the virtuous judge from acting virtuously. The
virtue of courage keeps the open-minded judge from being swayed or
prejudiced by any pressure that could promote deviation from seeking
the just end. Courage, quite simply, is the virtue which steels the person
to meet the challenges that endanger or threaten the judge who must
survive the tide of strong public sentiment in order to protect those who
need protection.69 In order to achieve or at least seek justice, there can
be instances when a judge may have to point out that his colleagues and,
perhaps, even the nation are wrong. Precedent for this virtue extends
back to the Ancient Near East in which the "governing elite had a very
special responsibility for the lower fringes of society."7 ° Examples of
judges having the courage to stand apart from the majority of their col-
leagues, as well as the majority of strong, popular sentiment, are Jus-
tices McLean and Curtis who dissented in the antebellum case of Dred
Scott v. Sanford71-a case that declared that black persons were not to
68 Id. at 3, 29, 69; Bork Hearings, supra note 26, at 92; Souter Hearings, supra note 23, at
25-26, 32, 42.
69 See MACINTYRE, supra note 3, at 191.
We hold courage to be a virtue because the care and concern for individuals,
communities and causes which is so crucial to so much in practices requires the
existence of such a virtue. If someone says that he cares for some individual,
community or cause, but is unwilling to risk harm or danger on his, her or its
own behalf, he puts in question the genuineness of his care and concern. Cour-
age, the capacity to risk harm or danger to oneself, has its role in human life
because of this connection with care and concern.
id.
In a small footnote which frequently eclipses the legal significance of the case in which
it appeared, the United States Supreme Court provided one arena in which a judge may
have to have courage to go against the tide to protect the unpopular, the minority, or the
outcast. As the Court said in 1938, a "more searching judicial inquiry" may be needed to
protect "discrete and insular minorities." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 153 n.4 (1938).
70 NORBERT LOHFINK, S.J., OPTION FOR THE POOR: THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF LIBERATION
THEOLOGY IN THE LIGHT OF THE BIBLE (1987).
71 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 529 (1857) (McLean & Curtis, JJ., dissenting).
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be considered "citizens" for purposes of constitutional protection. An-
other example of judicial courage was the first Justice Harlan who, in
Plessy v. Ferguson,7 2 disagreed that the "separate but equal" doctrine
was constitutional. More recently, Justices Murphy, Roberts, and Jack-
son dissented in the Japanese-American internment cases which were
commonplace during World War I1.
73
Since 1981, some members of the Senate Judiciary Committee have
developed and maintained a tradition of commenting on a variety of cri-
teria for the selection of judicial nominees, especially those who are se-
lected to fill vacancies on the nation's highest court. However, criteria
that mandate that a judge be a compassionate person who is scholarly,
patient, open-minded, and diligent do not always receive the attention
they merit in ascertaining a candidate's fitness for a vacant judicial post.
There are times when the politics surrounding the nomination can do
much to promote the candidate whose virtues are unknown or defeat the
candidates whose virtues are recognized.
III. POLITICS AND VIRTUE: THE MIXTURE OF OIL AND WATER
This section focuses on a few of the political episodes which, in some
cases, slowed the confirmation process and, in others such as Judge
Bork's, defeated the candidacy. It is not designed to comment on the cor-
rectness or error of the role of politics in making judicial appointments.
Rather, this section illustrates that when political considerations are un-
duly emphasized, the important personal qualifications of the candidate,
particularly those which focus on virtues, can be overshadowed.
In 1981, political opponents of Judge O'Connor came forward to criti-
cize her abortion stand while she was a member of the Arizona legisla-
ture.7 4 Similarly, political groups critical of Justice Rehnquist 5 and
Judge Souterv 6 were able to steer the Senate Judiciary committee away
from personal qualifications and toward political and ideological views.
7 7
However, these excursions into the realm of political views which were or
72 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
74 O'Connor Hearings, supra, note 7, at 280-83, 368-74, 396 (representatives of the Na-
tional Right to Life Committee offered testimony opposing O'Connor's confirmation).
75 Rehnquist Hearings, supra, note 23, at 411-15, 470-84, 568-618, 709-11, 738-70, 780-
931, 949-78, and 984-1077.
76 Souter Hearings, supra note 23, at 362-415, 430-547, 565-607, 666-719, 777-857, 890-
906.
77 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology, Judicial Selection and Judicial Ethics, 2 GEO. J. L.
ETHICs 643, 646 (1989) (proposing that evaluation of judicial candidates "should include
consideration of ideology" by asking nominees questions on views concerning judicial prece-
dents in specific cases).
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might be in disfavor with some interest group did not prohibit the confir-
mations of Rehnquist, O'Connor, or Souter.
However, political considerations were given much greater promi-
nence in the nomination of Judge Bork to the Supreme Court. Ulti-
mately, after 6511 pages of hearing testimony, reports, printed state-
ments, and other materials, the Senate Judiciary Committee in a tally of
nine to five voted against Judge Bork.7 s With his integrity intact, his
temperament and demeanor unquestioned, his intelligence above re-
proach, Judge Bork was largely denied confirmation because the major-
ity of the Judiciary Committee, and subsequently fifty-eight members of
the Senate, concluded that his judicial philosophy ran counter to funda-
mental rights and liberties protected by the Constitution.7 9
One important commentary on the undoing of the Bork nomination
comes from Bruce Ackerman, a distinguished professor of law at Yale
University. Professor Ackerman has contributed to the understanding of
how legal and political forces can combine to defeat a nomination. 0 Ack-
erman comments that,
when judged by normal personal and professional criteria, Robert
Bork is among the best qualified candidates for the Supreme Court of
this or any other era. Few nominees in our history compare with him
in the range of their professional accomplishments .... Few compare
in the seriousness of their lifelong engagement with the fundamental
questions of constitutional law. Of course, Bork's answers to these
questions are controversial. But who can be surprised by that? Even
those, like myself, who disagree with Bork both can and should admire
the way he has woven theory and practice, reason and passion, into a
pattern that expresses so eloquently our deepest hopes for a life in the
law. The Republic needs more people like Robert Bork. It is a tragedy
that the Republic should repay him for his decades of service by pub-
licly humiliating him.
8 1
Professor Ackerman raises the relevance of virtue in the context of
the Bork nomination when he proffers that confirmation was denied due
to public perception of President Reagan's political aspirations, rather
than Judge Bork's stance on controversial moral issues.8 2
78 See Bork Hearings, supra note 26, at 2.
79 Id. at 6-65, 96-99 (Senate Judiciary Committee majority report concludes that Judge
Bork was not within mainstream American judicial philosophy).
80 See BRUCE A. AcKERMAN, SOCIAL. JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
81 Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1164 (1988)
[hereinafter Ackerman, Transformative Appointments]. The author further suggests that
"Bork's remarkable virtues crystallized the question of transformative appointments ...
[he] did not owe his nomination to his sex, race, religion, national origin, or regional roots
... [but] to the power of his mind, the vigor of his ideas, and his demonstrated capacity to
act on his convictions in moments of crisis." Id. at 1170.
82 Id. at 1165. Professor Ackerman stated that,
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Mindful that philosophical differences distinguish the legal views of
Robert Bork and Bruce Ackerman, one might agree with Professor Ack-
erman that some nominees (and perhaps members of the Senate who
confirm or defeat judicial nominations) who live "most of their adult lives
in politics" are accustomed "to dealing in sweeping (if vague) pronuncia-
mentos."s 3 In the American political scheme, where the ability to com-
promise is essential to the passage of legislation, personal morality, vir-
tue, and integrity often become anecdotal afterthoughts, rather than the
primary focus, of legislators.8 4 As Judge Abner Mikva of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has indi-
cated, the Senate as a political body is "not comfortable" with questions
of morality and allegations of moral "wrongdoing." 5
Professor Ackerman's commentary about the Bork affair acknowl-
edges that the nominee was a man of integrity, keen intelligence, and
virtue, whose opportunity to sit on the nation's highest court was frus-
trated by political concerns reflecting interests vital to several national
constituencies and interest groups.8 6 The role of politics in the confirma-
tion process is indirectly mandated by the United States Constitution,
8 7
and, in a more practical sense, is essential to maintaining our represen-
[a]s in classic tragedy, Bork's undoing was the product of his greatest virtues.
When his moment came to walk the center of the constitutional stage, these
virtues could no longer be interpreted simply as testimony to his distinguished
service. Instead, the nation's constitutional history endowed them with a dra-
matically different meaning: Bork's superqualification came to symbolize Ron-
ald Reagan's aspiration to rival Franklin Roosevelt's success in revolutionizing
constitutional law by means of transformative appointments to the Supreme
Court.
Id.
83 Id. at 1168.
84 See Paul Simon, Advice and Consent: The Senate's Role in the Judicial Nomination Pro-
cess, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 41, 43 (1991) (urging Senators to "examine their
consciences rather than public opinion" when approving Supreme Court nominees).
85 Abner J. Mikva, How Should We Select Judges In A Free Society?, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 547,
550 (1992). Prior to his appointment to the federal bench during the Carter administration,
Judge Mikva served as a member of Congress, and before that, as a member of the Illinois
State Legislature. Consequently, Judge Mikva can argue with an additional degree of con-
viction that political bodies such as the Senate cannot be comfortable with morals charges
and related misconduct because "[too many of its members have had to respond to some
such attack during their political lives to find any joy in reviewing similar charges when
made against a presidential nominee." Id.
86 See David Stewart, Appointing Strangers, 77 A.B.A. J. 50 (Nov. 1991) (noting Bork was
perceived as the "militant embodiment of the conservative political agenda").
87 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The President "shall have power, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to . .. nominate ... judges of the Supreme Court." Id.
(emphasis added).
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tative form of government."8 Professor Ackerman and others, however,
have suggested that its role be limited.89 Political and social philosophies
are relevant and legitimate avenues of investigation-to a reasonable
point. Ascertaining other information can also help unearth and assess
a nominee's record both in prior decisions, if he currently sits on the
bench, or in academic articles and speeches. 90 After all, a nominee's rec-
ord may be readily scrutinized by investigating the "paper trail," which
indicates how he or she has confronted and resolved certain issues in
prior rulings.9 ' But past actions may not be an accurate barometer for
determining what the nominee may do in the future if appointed to judi-
cial office. While the record may satisfactorily indicate who the nominee
is, it does not necessarily suggest where the nominee's future decisions
and judicial philosophy will go.9 2 It should be just as beneficial to evalu-
88 See W. William Hodes, The Overtly "Political" Character of the Advice and Consent
Function: Offsetting the Presidential Veto with Senatorial Rejection, 7 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 109, 123-24 (1991); Ronald W. Eades, Judicial Nomination: A Cooperative Ef-
fort, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 93, 96-97 (1991); Nina Tottenberg, The Confirmation
Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1213, 1227-29 (1988)
(Senate's role in confirmation process essential to articulate public sentiment).
89 See Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, supra note 81, at 1164-65; Irving R. Kauf-
man, Keeping Politics out of the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1984, § 3 (Magazine), at 72
(citing potential danger of public belief that judiciary is a "third and powerful political
branch of government"). Judge Kaufman expressed concern over the President's attempt to
politicize the judiciary. Id. He cautioned against the selection of candidates based on their
propensity to decide, in a certain way, the issues of "abortion, school prayer, capital punish-
ment, [and] other great social concerns." Id. at 86. See Bork Hearings, supra note 26, at
3241-44. The text of a letter from then University of Chicago Law School Dean Gerhard
Casper and Robert H. Mundheim related their concerns about the "partisan political char-
acter" surrounding the Bork nomination. Id. See also Terri J. Peretti, Restoring the Bal-
ance of Power: The Struggle for Control of the Supreme Court, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69,
102 (1992); Annual Judicial Conference-Second Judicial Circuit Court of the United
States, 120 F.R.D. 141, 228-29 (1987); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify
More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 81-82 (1991).
90 See Mikva, supra note 85, at 556. Judge Mikva suggests, "It would indeed be unfortu-
nate if we exclude from the process [of judicial selection] those very people who have
thought about and expressed themselves about the important issues of our time." Id. See
also Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1185, 1185-98 (1988); Shel-
don Goldman, Judicial Selection and the Qualities that Make a "Good" Judge, 462 THE
ANNALS OF THE AM. AcAD. OF POL. & SOUND SCI. 112, 115 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1982).
91 While this method provides a means of deciphering a judge's past record, however, it
may not be the most suitable tool for assisting the Senate in its task of confirmation. See
Carter, supra note 90, at 1189-95.
92 The predictability of how a nominee will perform on the bench once confirmed can often
be an uncertain enterprise. See Stewart, supra note 86. The appointees of neither Theodore
Roosevelt (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.) nor Franklin Roosevelt (Felix Frankfurter) exhib-
ited the type of judicial inclinations for which they were nominated. Id. Once appointed to
the bench, however, judges can be surprising. When President Eisenhower was asked if he
had made any decisions which he later regretted, he reportedly answered, "Two, and
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ate and predict the nominee's judicial future by assessing his attributes
that concern the virtues of justice, prudence, courage, and wisdom.93
Just as the virtue of temperance can restrain or caution a judge or judi-
cial candidate from advancing into a legal foray without prudently con-
sidering the case beforehand, so too can those nominating and confirm-
ing judges rely upon this virtue in the exercise of their official duties. 94
As Judge Mikva argued,
[tihe litmus test, then, of a good appointment and confirmation proce-
dure is restraint. There ought to be executive restraint-while the
President is entitled to appoint people he likes and respects, he ought
not exact or expect any pledge of fealty to the Chief ....
There ought to be senatorial restraint too. The senators may have le-
gitimate curiosity about a nominee's views on the hot issues of the
day. But they ought to limit their questions to general philosophical
views, as opposed to asking "How would you rule on Roe v. Wade?"
Satisfying a senator's curiosity or some of the senator's activist con-
stituents is not the way to enhance judicial independence. 95
The virtuous judge could, in some cases, reach the same decision as
other judges do. However, the virtuous judge might also decide the case
differently. Though the primary function of the American court system
is the resolution of cases and controversies, this is not the exclusive role
of the judicial branch of government. The virtuous judge strives to be a
more discerning individual by assessing what the case is, where it should
go, and how best to reach the just end.96
they're both sitting on the Supreme Court." These "mistakes" were Earl Warren, the former
conservative governor of California, and William Brennan, the former corporate lawyer and
state judge from New Jersey.
93 See Goldman, supra note 90. Professor Goldman identifies eight qualities associated
with the "good judge": neutrality as to the parties in litigation, fair-mindedness, being well
versed in the law, ability to think and write logically and lucidly, personal integrity, good
physical and mental health, judicial temperament, and ability to handle judicial power sen-
sibly. Id. at 113-14.
94 See, e.g., Joerg W. Knipprath, The Judicial Appointment Process: An Appeal for Modera-
tion and Self-Restraint, 7 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 179 (1991) (favoring "de-
politiciz[ation]" of selection process and use of discretion and self-restraint in screening
nominees). The judicial selection process might enjoy a renewed sense of dignity if greater
emphasis were placed on the "ethic[s] of respect, tolerance and civility." Id. at 191.
95 Mikva, supra note 85, at 555-56.
96 See e.g., George Kannar, Strenuous Virtues, Virtuous Lives: The Social Vision Of
Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 1845, 1867 (1991) (suggesting direction in which virtu-
ous judge proceeds can vary from transcending social and political contexts of day to im-
mersing one's self in them). Kannar indicates that "the type of 'virtue' that ultimately dis-
tinguishes the extraordinary player from the ordinary highly skilled professional is not this
technical legal 'talent'. . . . The vision that makes the difference, then, is of the type we call
Iperipheral': a sense not just of what you personally believe or value, or of how to execute
the standard moves, but a deeper, more intuitive and more complex 'sense of where you
are.'" Id.
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IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE VIRTUOUS JUDGE
If the goal of justice is the "just end," how do judges get there? The
case of Grove City College v. Bell97 will supply a factual context in which
we can reflect on how the virtuous judge might approach assessing who
we are, where we want to go, and how we get there.
Grove City College is a small, sectarian school in Pennsylvania that
took careful steps to preserve its independence from government influ-
ence by avoiding applications for and acceptance of state and federal fi-
nancial assistance."8 The college practiced its general policy by refusing
to participate in government-sponsored student financial aid pro-
grams.9 9 However, many of the students of this coeducational college ap-
plied directly to the federal government for several types of federal
grants to help defray their expenses at the school. l0 0
In 1972, Congress enacted the Education Amendments Act (the
"Act").10 1 Title IX of the Act contained provisions to prevent and prohibit
gender discrimination at educational institutions which receive federal
financial assistance. 10 2 During the summer recess of 1977, the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") concluded that the col-
lege was a "recipient" of federal financial assistance because its students
used federal grants to pay tuition and other bills associated with enroll-
ment at the college.' 0 3 Subsequently, HEW ordered the college to exe-
cute and return an "Assurance of Compliance" form which each institu-
tional recipient of federal funds was required to complete.
10 4
The school received the order but refused to comply, arguing that it
was not a recipient of federal funds and, therefore, not obliged to do as
HEW requested.'0 5 Subsequently, HEW began a compliance proceeding
against the school to determine whether the HEW requirements had ad-
97 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
98 Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 701 n.29 (3d Cir. 1982).
99 Id. "For over a century, the College has steadfastly maintained a strict independence
from government funding, holding that the ideals embodied in its educational philosophy
draw their essence from the practice of institutional self-sufficiency and autonomy." Id.
100 Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253, 257, 259, 263 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
101 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681.
102 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Section 1681(a) states, in pertinent part: "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance .... " Id.
103 Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. at 255.
104 Id. The relevant portion of this form stated that the recipient would "[c]omply, to the
extent applicable to it, with Title IX ... and all requirements.. . [so that] no person...
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
otherwise subjected to discrimination under any education programs or activity for which
the Applicant receives or benefits from federal financial assistance." 687 F.2d at 705-06.
105 500 F. Supp. at 255.
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equately been met.10 6 The facts obtained by the administrative law
judge assigned to hear the administrative case found that "[there was
not the slightest hint of any failure to comply with Title IX save the re-
fusal to submit an executed assurance of compliance with Title IX."lO7
Despite this finding, the judge concluded that he was obliged to follow
the Department's regulations mandating termination of the financial
grants received by the Grove City College students.10
8
Shortly after this determination was made, two male and two female
students of Grove City College sued HEW seeking: (1) an order declaring
void the termination of federal grants; (2) an injunction preventing HEW
from requiring the college to file an "Assurance of Compliance" in order
to preserve eligibility for federal funding; and (3) a declaration that the
anti-sex discrimination regulations were unconstitutional with respect to
the college.' 0 9 Although the federal district court found the school to be
a "recipient" of government financial aid, it prevented the termination of
the grants to the students "unless and until there is a specific finding of
sex discrimination."" 0 The court properly noted that "both male and fe-
male students.., will be irreparably harmed by losing their financial aid
in a case where there is absolutely no evidence of sex
discrimination."'l'
It is submitted that the model virtuous judge would recognize how
vital the absence of evidence of discrimination is to adjudicating a case
like Grove City College. The district court judge demonstrated elements
essential to this model when he stated that, a fortiori, it "should be ap-
parent to men and women of reason that Congress did not intend to de-
prive students of their financial educational benefits where there is no
evidence or even an accusation of sex discrimination at the College in
question as is the case at bar."
112
It is more difficult to see evidence of the virtuous judge in the subse-
quent appeal before the Third Circuit. 113 The Court of Appeals dis-
agreed with the lower court and held that the government was author-
ized by Title IX to terminate the benefits received by the students. 114 It
is suggested that the judge who adopts virtue in the exercise of his duty
would concentrate more on ascertaining whether discrimination was
106 Id. Not one student was named as a respondent despite the fact "over three hundred of
them had a direct interest in the outcome of th[e] hearing." Id.
107 Id. at 255.
108 See id. at 256.
109 687 F.2d at 689.
110 500 F. Supp. at 270.
111 Id. (emphasis supplied).
112 Id. at 272.
113 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
114 Id. at 704-05.
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present on than whether a piece of paper (the execution of which could be
self-serving) was properly filed with the government. Consequently, the
virtuous judge would seek to effect a result whereby both male and fe-
male students would receive federal funds and no student was denied
funding on gender-based grounds.
1 15
The review by the Supreme Court1 1 6 did not result in the college's
vindication.' 1 7 In a separate concurring opinion, however, Justice Pow-
ell demonstrated elements of virtuous conduct, stating:
I... write briefly to record my view that th[is] case is an unedifying
example of overzealousness on the part of the Federal Government
.... One would have thought that the Department, confronted as it is
with cases of national importance that involve actual discrimination,
would have respected the independence and admirable record of this
college. But common sense and good judgment failed to prevail. The
Department chose to litigate . . . despite the College's record as an
institution that had operated to date in full accordance with the letter
and spirit of Title IX.118
Should the virtuous judge have been more concerned with facts crucial
about the absence of gender discrimination? Should the virtuous jurist
have been more understanding of the broad underlying substantive pur-
pose of Title IX to eradicate gender discrimination in educational institu-
tions? Should the virtuous judge have been more discerning that a
school could be in compliance with Title IX even though it did not com-
plete a form, whereas a school that fills out the compliance document and
submits it to the government stating that Title IX has been observed
could in reality practice gender discrimination? What, in essence, would
a virtuous judge have done differently than was done in Grove City
College?
I begin addressing these questions with the three general issues
upon which virtue ethics focus. I restate these issues so they conform to
the particulars of virtue with which a judge would be concerned: What
kind of people are the parties and the judge in this case and what do
their interests mean for them and the rest of society? What is it that the
parties and judge desire and how do these wishes for legal relief relate to
the interests of both the parties and the community at large which will
115 See, e.g., 500 F. Supp. at 259.
116 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
117 See id. at 574. "Recipients must provide assurance only that 'each education program
or activity operated by ... [them] and to which this part applies will be operated in compli-
ance with this part.'" Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (1983)). "The regulations apply. . 'to
every recipient and to each education program or activity operated by such recipient which
receives or benefits from federal financial assistance.'" Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.11
(1983).
118 465 U.S. at 576-78. (Powell, J., concurring).
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be affected by the legal precedent established by the court's decision?
What does the virtuous judge consider in order to reach a just decision?
The judge's reliance on and practice of the virtues of justice, prudence,
temperance (or restraint), compassion, and wisdom will help him or her
address these three basic issues.
The judge recognizes that the judicial role in any case is to render a
decision that resolves the conflict based on the law as it applies to each
case. The judge's role and responsibilities call for a synthesis of fact-
finding, interpretation of judicial precedent and applicable statutes, and
the application of precedents and statutes to each case. In a situation
similar to the facts of Grove City College, the virtuous judge acknowl-
edges that Title IX contains a broad purpose of ensuring that educational
institutions that receive financial assistance from the government do not
discriminate against anyone on the basis of gender. 119 In order to imple-
ment this policy, the judge is empowered to uphold any administrative
determination withdrawing federal funds from any person or institution
who discriminates against anyone because of that person's gender.' 20
These considerations help us determine "who the parties are" and "who
the judge is" at the outset of the legal proceedings.
The just end toward which the virtuous judge is inclined, then, be-
gins with determining whether or not a person was prejudicially treated
because of gender-because he or she was excluded from participation
in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discriminatory treatment under
an educational program or activity receiving federal funds. 2 ' The
judge's conduct during the course of proceedings is molded by the mis-
sion of reaching this end. The virtue of justice, in short, aids the judge in
recognizing that the execution of judicial duties entails working toward
this goal of the just result.'2 2 The result is shaped by the public policy
designed to protect people from improper discrimination because they
happen to be male or female. Inherent in this goal is the understanding
that individuals should be treated fairly without consideration given to
their sex. While there could well be cases in which a person's gender
may be a valid criterion for making a decision about eligibility to partici-
pate in a particular program, there is no justification warranting the use
of this criterion in federally funded educational programs or activities. 
12 3
119 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 108.
121 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
122 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1, 2 (1990).
123 For cases involving issues similar to Grove City College, see generally North Haven Bd.
of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (Title IX intended to ban employment discrimination
in federally-funded education programs); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir.
1993) (preliminary injunction requiring university to reinstate women's sports teams up-
held); Pfeiffer by Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990) (opera-
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But how does the virtuous judge attain this goal that is determined
by the virtue of justice? If justice is the goal, the virtue of prudence can
be relied upon to reach that goal by providing the means to act justly.124
One of the questions associated with an ethics based on virtue is, "How
do we arrive at the result we seek?" The answer to this question requires
patient attentiveness essential to examining the facts of the case and
hearing the concerns of the parties involved. In Grove City College, the
government was legitimately concerned about funding education pro-
grams or activities that discriminated against individuals on account of
their gender. The prudent judge would strive to understand fully this
and related concerns. By the same token, the prudent judge would also
be equally attentive to the position and actions of the educational institu-
tion that ultimately received the benefit of the federal money. In Grove
City College, the virtuous judge would have taken steps to determine if
any of the students were prejudiced or discriminated against by being
denied federal funds on account of their gender.
Prudence relies on the ability to distinguish between different sets of
values that can promote or defeat the attainment of the just end. Re-
cently Judge Leon Higginbotham, Chief Judge Emeritus of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, reminded us that bad
judges were not accountable for the "separate but equal" rule of Plessy v.
Ferguson'25 but, rather, "the wrong values" which "poisoned this society
for decades."' 2 6 Prudence guides the action for investigating, realisti-
cally, the values that determine the policies of the institution: Did the
college promote programs geared to only one gender? The prudent
judge's search might reveal that some educational institutions have in-
deed discriminated against certain classes of people by excluding them
from particular activities. 127 The prudent judge is concerned about the
identity of the students who directly received the grants from the govern-
ment. Was there a fair representation of both sexes at the institution?
Was there an equal distribution of grants between students of both gen-
ders? Answers to each of these questions would be vital to the prudent
tion of all female school does not bear "substantial relationship to state interest of provid-
ing equal education opportunities"). Cf Hillside College v. Department of Health, Educ.
and Welfare, 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982) (student loan and grant program, not entire
college, subject to Title IX regulation).
124 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
126 A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter To Justice Clarence Thomas From A Fed-
eral Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1005, 1010 (1992).
127 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (concluding racially
discriminatory policies of university would deny school benefit of tax exempt status). See
also supra note 110.
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judge in deciding whether to uphold or reverse the government's unilat-
eral decision to terminate the grants.
Allied with the virtue of prudence is the virtue of wisdom. In a case
like Grove City College, the virtue of wisdom fortifies the judge with the
sagacity to understand the goal of effectively addressing discrimination.
Wisdom helps the judge discern whether or not individuals have been
discriminated against. Wisdom also clarifies the vital distinction be-
tween failure to submit a form'2 8 and the operations which unlawfully
favor one class of students over another on the basis of gender. Reinhold
Niebuhr once said that "[t]he most perfect justice cannot be established if
the moral imagination of the individual does not seek to comprehend the
needs and interests of his fellows."' 2 9 Wisdom activates the moral imagi-
nation which can better see what facts constitute the "most perfect
justice."
Like most individuals in public life, judges are open to criticism for
the actions they pursue and the decisions they make. History shows that
judges who follow morally correct instincts and arrive at unpopular con-
clusions can suffer.' 30 Verbal castigation, as well as physical threat, can
be directed toward judges. The virtue of courage helps steel the judge
against unwarranted criticism, and perhaps even against threat of bod-
ily harm by reinforcing the practice of the other virtues, and by helping
the judge meet harm or danger while working toward a just end. In
Grove City College, courage could assist the virtuous judge in deflecting
criticism which advocates special causes or displays of animosity to the
notion of equality and nondiscrimination.
The aforementioned list of qualities for the virtuous judge may not
be comprehensive. It does, however, give us some further understanding
and greater insight on valid and valuable qualities from which the guar-
antors of fairness and justice in the United States can profit. Further-
more, those individuals having a role in the appointment of judges could
do well by adapting and practicing these virtues in their own participa-
tion in the selection and confirmation of judicial candidates.' 3 1
128 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
129 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 257-58 (1960).
130 See INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE 196 (1991). It is contended that very few princi-
pled judges in the Third Reich were willing to take a stand against the injustices of the
Nazi regime. Id. See also generally ABA SUBCOMMITTEE ON UNJUST CRITICISM OF THE
BENCH, UNJUST CRITICISM OF JUDGES (1986) (acknowledging unfair attacks on judiciary
and proposing responses).
131 See Kaufman, supra note 89, at 86. Judge Kaufman urges nomination to the high court
of "a paragon of virtue, an intellectual Titan and an administrative wizard-or, in the
words of Justice Holmes, a 'combination of Justinian, Jesus Christ and John Marshall." Id.
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CONCLUSION
Recently, Judge Harry Edwards of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit suggested that a lawyer has a
duty not only to serve his or her clients but also to serve the public
good. 132 Judge Edwards further concluded that these two duties are not
mutually exclusive. 133 Borrowing from Judge Edwards, it is suggested
that a judge also serves two constituencies. He has a duty to bring jus-
tice to both parties as well as to society at large. Again, as Judge Ed-
wards indicates, these responsibilities are not mutually exclusive. In ad-
judicating a case and resolving a conflict between parties, a judge also
establishes a precedent or makes an interpretation that has an impor-
tant effect on future cases and on the contemporaneous legal culture con-
sisting of lawyers and other judges. Such judges and practitioners may
consider the virtuous judge's decision and incorporate it into their own
work.
In this day, when difficult issues such as affirmative action, abor-
tion, and race relations join many other important questions before the
courts, judges are faced with the challenging tasks of resolving conflicts
and rendering decisions. The difficulties in meeting these challenges be-
come sharpened upon the realization that neither party may be entirely
deserving of a judgment in its favor. The morally correct result may not
be dispositive of the controversy. In cases involving abortion, affirmative
action, or reverse discrimination, interest groups and individuals may
assert political pressure on the judiciary for results that would be desira-
ble to them. More and more, constituencies representing a variety of in-
terests pressure those making decisions about the appointment of judges
to solicit not only views but sometimes specific commitments on how a
prospective judge or justice may decide or vote on certain kinds of cases
involving these volatile issues.
1 3 4
Stephen Carter has offered some wise and prudent counsel in this
regard which I believe reinforces the proposal that a good judge (and,
therefore, a good judicial candidate) should not be ascertained on the ba-
sis of what kinds of legal theories he or she espouses, or how he or she
may decide a case. Carter argues that it is better to know what kind of
person the judge or judicial candidate is so that anyone seeking justice,
fairness, equality, compassion, and understanding will be treated with
courtesy and respect. 135 If this treatment can be extended to all litigants
132 Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty To Serve The Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1148,
1149 (1990).
133 Id.
134 See generally Carter, supra note 90, at 1196-1201 (interests of democracy not advanced
by confirming judges who reflect current moral norms).
135 Id. at 1199.
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and counsel appearing before the court, they can take comfort knowing
that their interests and concerns will be heard and considered fairly and
evenly. Carter identifies two bases why we should know "what sort of
person the nominee happens to be":
First, the nominee ought to be a person for whom moral choices occa-
sion deep and sustained reflection. Second, the nominee ought, in the
judgment of the Senate, to be an individual whose personal moral de-
cisions seem generally sound. In moments of crisis, we call upon the
Court for a statement of law and, more often than most theorists care
to admit, we receive instruction in practical morality instead. At such
times, what matters most is not what sort of legal philosophers sit on
the Court, but what sort of moral philosophers sit there .... The back-
ground moral vision and the capacity for moral reflection are perhaps
the most important aspects of the judicial personality, and it is for
these that the Senate, which enjoys the political space to reflect on the
fundamental values of the nation, ought to be searching.
136
A thoughtful appraisal of a nominee's character and virtues can tell
a good deal about what sort of judge the nominee will be. It cannot tell
us how a judge will decide certain cases, nor should it. If those partici-
pating in, or otherwise influencing, the selection and appointment pro-
cess want to predict the kinds of decisions a judicial candidate will make,
neither justice, nor the parties, nor our national community will be well
served. If judges are not guided by achieving just ends but rather by
attaining predictable political goals, then the aims of justice are compro-
mised. The virtues of justice, prudence, courage, and wisdom reveal lit-
tle about how a judge will decide a specific case. Nevertheless, they are
indicative of the kind of person he is and how best to arrive at a just
solution for individuals as well as the public good.
And that is as it should be.
136 Id.
